The benefits of mandatory recording are numerous. First, it ensures that suspects are protected because they are allowed to have their exact words recorded electronically rather than having a statement or confession written for them by a law enforcement official. In this way, it also protects law enforcement officials from accusations of coercion or intimidation because the entire confession is recorded and available verbatim for use at trial. Electronic recording also helps to protect suspects from false confessions resulting from coercion, intimidation, exhaustion, etc. There are many more benefits to electronic confessions that can be found in this article from The Justice Project.

Simply put, there is no reason given the state of technology today that some form of electronic recording of interrogations should be mandated in all fifty states, including Tennessee where there is no such mandate currently in place. Electronic recording of interrogation would provide an important safeguard against false and coerced confessions at merely the cost of a tape recorder or video camera. Given that the liberty of suspects is at stake, there is no persuasive reason why the interrogation process should not be preserved verbatim for use during the trial process.

This holding makes sense for many reasons, maybe most notably the fact that the criminal justice system places a great emphasis on making sure that defendants receive notice of the laws under which they are charged. It is this emphasis on notice that is evident in the United States Constitution, which forbids the government from passing any ex post facto law that would criminalize conduct or change the penalty for that conduct after the conduct has already happened. Simply put, it is unconstitutional for a defendant to be affected by any law that was not in effect and published at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct without the consent of the defendant.

Source: (State v. Gholston, 35 TAM 10-18, 1/5/10, Nashville, Tipton, 5 pages.)

In the case of State v. Martinez, the defendant was accused of aggravated rape and fled to Mexico to avoid the charges. He was apprehended in Mexico and signed an extradition agreement that allowed him to be sent back to the United States for trial which contained a provision that stipulated that the trial court could not seek a sentence of life imprisonment in the defendant’s case. The defendant pleaded guilty upon returning to the United States and was sentenced to eighty-eight years in prison. Since the defendant was not born in the Old Testament and is most likely not a vampire, this is effectively a life sentence. Not surprisingly, the defendant argued that the trial court had imposed a life sentence on him in violation of the extradition agreement. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals did not agree with the defendant and upheld his sentence.

In this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished between a “life sentence” and a “sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy.” Even though the sentence in this case was eighty-eight years, it did not qualify as the former and merely fell into the latter category. Thus, the defendant basically pleaded guilty to the exact sentence that he was trying to avoid. The lesson learned, that a “life sentence” does not include sentences that extend beyond the amount of time a defendant expects to live but only includes a literal sentence of life in prison, was a costly one in this case. One way to avoid a mistake like the one that was made in this case is to rely on experienced defense counsel to guide you through the trial process.

Source: (State v. Martinez, 35 TAM 10-17, 1/11/10, Nashville, McLin, 17 pages.)

The Tennessee Code sets out a list of enhancement factors the court may consider in imposing a sentence. When the court decides to use an enhancement factor to “enhance” a defendant’s sentence, the court must specifically state that it is applying the factor and set out how much weight it is placing on that factor and why. This enables the appellate court to review the use of the factor in determining if the sentence was appropriate.
One restriction that Tennessee law has placed upon the usage of enhancement factors is that an enhancement factor cannot be used to enhance a sentence if that factor is already an element of the offense. A good example comes from a case styled State v. Nolan that came before the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals recently. In this case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, of which one element is “serious bodily injury.” In sentencing the defendant, the judge also applied the enhancement factor found in T.C.A. § 40-35-114(6) which states that a defendant’s sentence can be enhanced if the injuries inflicted on the victim were “particularly great.” The defendant contended that his sentence was excessive and the Court of Criminal Appeals examined the sentence. The Court ruled that the enhancement factor applied by the court was effectively equivalent to the “serious bodily injury” element of aggravated assault and that to apply the enhancement factor would essentially be equal to punishing the defendant twice for the same offense.

The moral of this story, however, is not that if you are going to commit an offense that involves serious bodily injury to go ahead and beat them up really good because no one can do anything about it. Rather, it is that defendants may be able to contest the application of enhancement factors in situations where they are not appropriate. An experienced criminal defense attorney can assist a great deal in such a matter.

Source: State v. Nolan, 35 TAM 9-29, 12/28/09, Knoxville, Tipton, 10 pages.

The Hester analysis, while it was and still is accurate, has since been superseded with regard to how to analyze a search by a test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. U.S. Katz established a two-part test for what constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, for a search to have occurred, it must have taken place in an area for which a person has an actual expectation of privacy (this is based on the specific person’s expectation, not an objective analysis). Second, the expectation of privacy must be reasonable. This case was based on the idea that the Fourth Amendment aims to protect the rights of citizens rather than the rights of certain locations, thus basing whether or not a search has occurred largely on the perception of the suspect in light of what society considers reasonable.

This case overruled the “open fields” doctrine to an extent, as it shifted the focus away from what was or was not a constitutionally protected area and toward the two-part test described above. However, the same result would be reached for all practical purposes with regard to the subject of “open fields” under the new analysis. Under the Katz test, there simply would be no search at all, since the location is one in which the Supreme Court has already ruled a person can not reasonably expect to have a constitutionally protected privacy right.

As a result of such a controversy, the United States Supreme Court established what is known as the “Open Fields” doctrine. In Hester v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that although a person is free from unreasonable seizures with respect to the four categories mentioned above, open fields do not fall within any of those categories. In doing so, the court basically held that a citizen cannot reasonably expect to have a constitutionally protected right of privacy with respect to open fields, in part because it would be near-impossible to safeguard that privacy in many situations.

"You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview."

The problem with this warning is that the defendant was not explicitly advised that he had the right to have counsel present during questioning. While the Court found that the language of this warning was sufficient to convey to the defendant that he had this right and that it could be exercised at any time, the plain language of the warning suggests a different interpretation. While the warning suggests that the defendant can invoke any of his rights at any time during the interview, the right to talk to a lawyer is specifically limited by the phrase “before answering any of our questions.” Such phrasing could easily have suggested to the defendant that he had the right to consult to his attorney prior to questioning but no such right during or after questioning given the way that right was described in the above warning. This may not, and probably was not, how the phrase was intended by the law enforcement official who gave the warning, but it was nevertheless ambiguous and arguably did not clearly convey that the defendant had the right to have his criminal defense attorney present before, during, and after questioning.

Given that what was at stake here was basically the right of law enforcement officials to ad lib Miranda warnings with impunity versus the constitutional rights of the defendant, the Court should have been much stricter in applying the requirements of Miranda to the instant case. The decision in this case threatens to engender situations in which defendants are clearly not advised of their rights in accordance with Miranda but courts decide the warning given was effectively “good enough.” This is a dangerous situation that may serve to severely jeopardize defendants with regard to confessions and other evidence gathered during the interrogation process.

Source: http://onthedocket.org/articles/2010/02/23/court-approves-floridas-miranda-warning-feb-23-2010-0

First, the witness must be asked about the conviction on cross-examination. Basically, this means that the conviction can’t just be entered into evidence without the witness being asked about it. The thrust of this rule is that such convictions cannot get into evidence if the witness does not take the witness stand. This gives the witness the opportunity to admit, deny, or explain the conviction and allows the witness to have a fair chance to mitigate the damage that the conviction might to do his or her credibility or case.

Second, the crime must either be a felony or be a crime of dishonesty or false statement. This basically means that petty crimes and misdemeanor offenses that have nothing to do with the witness’s character for truthfulness will not be admissible. This reflects a conscious determination that felonies and offenses bearing on truthfulness are the only prior convictions with enough relevance to be presented to the jury in the courtroom.

Third, if the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial, the State has to give the defendant reasonable written notice of the conviction before trial, and the court must make a determination that the conviction's probative value as to credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. The court can rule on the admissibility of the conviction prior to the trial but it must rule prior to the testimony of the accused. If the court makes a final determination that such proof is admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused does not have to actually testify at the trial to later challenge the court’s admission of the conviction.

The rule also contains various other protections designed to make sure that the conviction is relevant in the current proceeding. One of those protections is a rule that a conviction is much harder to get admitted if more than ten years has elapsed since the conviction or release from incarceration, depending on the circumstances. Such evidence is also not admissible in some circumstances where the defendant has received a pardon. In sum, although such evidence can be very damaging to the defendant, the defendant also has a substantial amount of protection against the admission of convictions that are not relevant and meaningful to the case at hand.

In Turner, the defendant was arrested for murder and robbery and taken into custody. While in custody, he gave a statement to police admitting his involvement in the crimes. However, defendant apparently made several different statements indicating his desire for a Tennessee criminal defense attorney during the interrogation process, which seemed to indicate that he was asserting his Miranda right to counsel and did not wish to proceed further into the process without an attorney. The defendant made statements such as “Are you my lawyer?”; “How quick will my lawyer get here?”; Will my lawyer get here today?”; Do I need to get a lawyer?”; and “Get me a lawyer.”

In the case detailed above, the state introduced testimony from a gas station clerk stating that after the gas station had been robbed, the clerk had went to a nearby witness and asked him to write down the license plate number of the van he had seen the suspect drive away in. The clerk then testified to the license plate number she had seen the witness write on the piece of paper. This raised an obvious confrontation issue because the defendant would thus have been forced to accept the facts that the witness had seen the defendant get into the van and had seen the license plate number of that van accurately without being availed of any opportunity to cross-examine the witness to see if he or she was actually in a position to see the license plate, was able to see well enough to make out the license plate from that distance, etc. The trial court allowed the testimony, but it was overruled by the intermediate appellate court. The Tennessee Supreme Court will now have to decide which one of those courts made the correct holding.

Source: State v. Franklin, 34 TAM 5-23 (Tenn.Cr.App. 2009), appeal granted 6/15/09, oral argument 2/12/10.

While it is true that defendants do not generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to places where a numerous amount of third parties have unfettered access, some circumstances in this case suggest that law enforcement officials may have overstepped their constitutional boundaries. For example, they specifically went to the defendant’s condominium and knocked on the door, asking if the defendant was home. Upon learning that he wasn’t home, they asked to be let in anyway while concealing the fact that they were detectives. This was done deliberately in an attempt to gather evidence that would provide probable cause for a more extensive search at a later time. Thus, law enforcement officials here essentially exploited the fact that the defendant was not home to manufacture probable cause without first obtaining a search warrant. The Court’s ruling on this one should be intriguing, as it pits the strength one of the most important rights guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution against the necessity of law enforcement officials having discretion as to how they perform their work.

Source: State v. Talley, 34 TAM 33-16 (Tenn.Cr.App. 2009), appeal granted 11/23/09, oral argument 2/11/10.

In State v. Brotherton, the Court will decide if a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle based on the fact that the taillight was not in “good condition” because it was projecting a glaring or dazzling light. In this case, the defendant had broken the taillight and attempted to repair it with red repair tape. The intermediate appellate court held that the taillight was in proper working condition in that it provided proper warning and safety measures to other motorists and thus was in “good condition.” Thus, it held that the officer did not have probable cause for the stop. As such, the stop would have been illegal and any evidence of criminal activity uncovered during the stop would probably be suppressed.

The first issue is that of lesser included offenses. A lesser included offense is an offense of which all the elements are included in a greater offense, but the greater offense has additional or different elements and a more severe penalty (with rare exceptions). In this case, the defendant contended that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to criminally negligent homicide when the defendant was charged with felony murder. Instruction as to lesser included offenses can be key for defendants in cases like this, primarily because it informs the jury that there are lesser offenses for which the defendant can be convicted. The jury may not be willing to let a defendant walk away without facing some sort of punishment in some situations, so they may be tempted to convict the defendant of a more serious offense than is actually fair in order to prevent the defendant from walking away scot-free. The defendant will try to convince the Tennessee Supreme Court that the trial court erred in failing to let the jury know that a lesser included offense was available rather than just the felony murder charge he was facing.

This case presents a complex issue, because arguments for both sides have some merit. From the point of view of the state, tampering with evidence will almost always be out of view of authorities, and its goal is to be undetectable. Thus, it will often be necessary to draw inferences from the surrounding facts to prove tampering rather than requiring an eyewitness every time.

In the upcoming case styled State v. Lewter, the Tennessee Supreme Court will decide if the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary and theft where the only evidence linking the defendant to the offense was a shirt that was left behind which contained skin cells matching the defendant’s DNA. The defendant was obviously convicted of the offenses based on this evidence at the trial court level or he would not have appealed. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court ruled that DNA is not like a fingerprint or blood sample in that its presence alone cannot prove that the defendant was present at the time of the theft and overturned the conviction. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, and the case now comes before the state’s highest court.